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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FA I JCON 1\ERO ENTERPRISE,
l N C., a Utah corporation, and

CHARLES W. TAGGART,
Plaintiffs-Respondents~

vs.

JOl-IN F. BOWERS, et al,

No.
10173

Defendants~

INTERMOUNTAIN DEVELOP~IENT, INC., a Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST.A.TE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action to quiet title to real property
brought by Plaintiffs as the successors in interest to
Salt Lake County, for which no source of title was
established, and the Defendant claiming as the fee owner
of the property.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a finding for
the Plaintiffs, this Defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the
decree, and for decree in its own favor as a matter of
law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant, Intermountain Development, Inc., established a chain of title to the property
concerned in the action back to the patentee (Pretrial
Exhibit 3) . Plaintiff-Respondent, Falconaero Enterprise, Inc., to support its claim, introduced in evidence
the following documents: Auditor's Deed, dated Feb·
ruary 28th, 1939, to Salt Lake County (Pre-trial Exhibit 4) ; quit~claim deed from Salt Lake County to
E. L. Hancock, dated December 31st, 1943 (P. Exhibit 3) ; deed from Ernest L. Hancock and Marie W.
Hancock, his wife, to A. D. Firmage, dated August
30th, 1948 (P. Exhibit 2); quit-claim deed from A. D.
Firmage and Hilda R. Firmage, his wife, to Falconaero Enterprise, Inc., dated May 27th, 1950 (Exhibit
1) ; warranty deed from Falconaero Enterprises, Inc.,
a corporation, to Charles W. Taggart, its. sole stockholder, dated June 29th, 1963 (Pre-trial Exhibit I),
which was prior to the filing of the within action.
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The evidence showed that the Secretary of State
of the State of Utah issued a certificate of dissolution
to the said Falconaero Enterprises, Inc., August 13th,
1nn:~ (Pre-trial Exhibit 2), which also was prior to the
comtnencement of the within action.
The evidence showed the payment of taxes on the
property herein concerned for the years 1955 to 1961,
both inclusive (P. Exhibit 30); by stipulation (Tr.
pages 67 to 69), the taxes for the years 1949 to 1954,
both inclusive, became delinquent, and t~e property was
redeetned from the preliminary treasurer's tax sales by
Falconaero on March 31, 1954, and November 22, 1955,
all amounts due by virtue of said sales having been fully
paid, including interest, costs and penalties.
The evidence showed the property in question
consisted of about 20 acres and was part of approximately a thousand-acre tract claimed by Falconaero.
On part of the property fronting on Redwood Road,
about three-fourths of a mile to the east from the
20-acre tract herein concerned, Falconaero operated a
chuck wagon restaurant and some stables. To the south
of the 20-acre tract, there was a lake to which some improvements had been made. The large tract, including
the 20-acre piece herein concerned, was used for grazing
horses, and the following revenues for such use were
receh·ed during the years 1957 to 1961, respectively:
$300.00, $210.00, $150.00, $400.00, and $246.00 (Tr.
pages 5-!, 55, P. Exhibits 22 to 28 inclusive). The 20acre tract was used only for pasture (Tr. 59).
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The testimony of the two Firmages (father and
son) and Mr. Bennett was to the effect that the larger
tract, of which the 20 acres was a part, was surrounded
by an electric barb wire fence (Tr. pages 30 to 40, 43,
55, 56) because it was economical ( Tr. p. 43). The
photos Plaintiff-Respondent submitted in evidence (P.
Exhibits 7 to 21, both inclusive) showed a line of posts,
irregularly spaced, with no fencing attached to any of
the posts except as shown in three or four of said photos.
In those photos which showed any wire attached to the
posts, the wire ran into the ground in each direction
from the posts to which it was attached. The intermittent fencing and irregularly spaced posts were confirmed by evidence introduced by Defendant-Appellant
(Tr. p. 74 to 85). Mr. Firmage admitted that they had
not planted crops on this tract (Tr. p. 48).
At the pretrial, Plaintiffs-Respondents admitted
that the county auditor did not comply with the law regarding the affixing of affidavits to the assessment rolls
for the years involved, regarding the 20-acre tract (Tr.
p. 10).
The evidence showed that Mr. Firmage and Falconaero considered the property suitable for commercial,
business and industrial purposes ( Tr. p. 48, and Pretrial Exhibit 2) , and that the property across the highway (21st South Street) to the north has been developed over the years as an industrial center, formerly
called the Arms Plant; that the property to the west
on 21st South, is lined on both sides with industrial and

6
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commercial enterprises (Tr. P. 49, 50). The large
tract. including the 20-acre piece concerned herein, was
sold recently for approximately $2,000.00 per acre
(Tr. p. 58, 59).
Over the objection of Defendant-Appellant, the
eourt at the pre-trial permitted Plaintiff Falconaero to
amend its complaint and add thereto the name of
Charles ,V. Taggart as an additional party plaintiff
('fr. p. 9).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTERPUlSES, INC., LACKED LEGAL CAPACITY
TO FILE SUIT, AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE ACTION.
Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero alleged in paragraph 1 of its Complaint its legal existence as a corporation (Tr. p. 2). As provided by Rule 9 (a) (I) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant-Appellant raised the issue of legal capacity in its Amendment
to its Answer ( Tr. p. 8) , and the documentary evidence
introduced at the pre-trial showed Falconaero had conYeyed all the assets of the corporation, including the
property subject to suit, to Mr. Taggart, its sole stockholder, on June 29th, 1963 (Pre-trial Exhibit 1), and
that pursuant to application of Falconaero, the certificate of dissolution was issued August 13th, 1963, more

7
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than a month prior to the filing of the within action
(Pre-trial Exhibit 2).
The effect of dissolution is stated in Model Business
Corporation Act Annotated, Vol. 2, page 537, as follows: "Without a saving statute, actions by and against
corporations which are dissolved or whose charters expire abate on dissolution."
The termination of the corporate existence after
dissolution is provided in Chapter 28, Section 88, Laws
of Utah, 1961, as follows:

" * * * Upon the issuance of such certificate of
dissolution the existence of the corporation shall cease,
except for the purpose of suits, other proceedings and
appropriate action by shareholders, directors and officers as provided in this act.n (Italics ours.)
There are two sections of the Utah Corporation
Act which provide a "saving" clause. Section 100,
Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1961, "saves" the corporation
in relation to rights, claims and liabilities. In the case
at bar, Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero had distributed its assets to Mr. Taggart, the sole stockholder,
prior to this suit. Thus, Falconaero did not have any
claim or right when suit was filed. While it is true it
did grant by warranty deed, it cannot be said that it
had created a liability to the grantee in so doing, as
Mr. Taggart was entitled only to what the corporation
had, and any warranty would not give rise to any liability upon the dissolved corporation. Thus, there being

8
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no clain1 or liability, Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero
does not emne within the scope of said Section 100, and
this ~ection cannot be the basis for continued corporate
existence.
The other saving statute, Section 101, Chapter 28,
I ~aws of Utah 1961, provides as follows:
"\Vinding Up Affairs. Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation ... , the corporate existence
of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the
purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any
property and assets which have not been distributed
or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution~ and
to effect such purpose such corporatoin may sell or
otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and
be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and
necessary powers." (Italics ours.)
In this case, the property was distributed to the
sole stockholder of the corporation, prior to dissolution.
The saYing effect of Section 101 is confined to property
not distributed prior to dissolution. Thus, this Section
cannot be used to prolong the corporate existence of
Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero .
. .-\.t the time this action was filed, Taggart had
any claim or property formerly held by Falconaero.
F alconaero no longer had either, so there was no need
to prolong the life of the dissolved corporation. If any
cause of action existed regarding the property, it belonged to Taggart and he should have filed, not Falconaero.

9

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section 88 provides for the death of a corporation
upon dissolution, and nothing in this case saves PlaintiffRepondent Falconaero from that death penalty. The
court should have dismissed the action for want of a
party plaintiff.

POINT 2.
PLAINTIFF FALCONAERO ENTERPRISE, INC., WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST, AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Although Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero alleged
in paragraph 3 of its Complaint (Tr. p. 2) that it was
the owner of the property in question, the evidence
showed it had conveyed away the property to its sole
stockholder in distributing the corporate assets, prior
to the commencement of the within action. Thus, Falconaero was not the real party in interest, as required
by Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wilson v. Kiesel, 9 U. 397, 35 P. 488, applying the
Utah statute then in effect, which had the same provisions found in Rule 17, held that if a party has parted
from his interest in a judgment prior to suit, he is not
the real party in interest in a new action brought on the
prior judgment.
In Glos v. Goodrich, 175 Ill. 20, 51 NE 643, the plaintiff sued to quiet title on some lots she had previously

10
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t·onvc)Td by warranty deed, some of the purchase money

having been withheld by the grantee pending the clearing of title. The court said: "One having no title to land
cannot contest a cloud upon the title created by an
incumbrance or an adverse title."

The Indiana statutes required every action to be
prosecuted by the real party in interest. In Chapman
v. .f ones, IJ.H Ind. 434, 47 NE 1065, 49 NE 347, the
plaintiff had conveyed the property by warranty deed
prior to the commencement of the action. The court
held the plaintiff had no interest left, and therefore,
could not quiet title. The same result in a quiet title
action was reached by the court in Jones v. Smith, 82
\\'. \'"a. 24<7, 95 SE 847.
In Gulley v. Christian, an Oklahoma case, 176 P2d
81 ~, the plaintiff alleged the quiet title action was
brought for the benefit of plaintiff's grantee. The court
dismissed the action for the reason that the plaintiff
was not the real party in interest.
Therefore, in the case at bar, Plaintiff-Respondent
Falconaero, having distributed the property involved
to its sole stockholder prior to the filing of the within
action, was not, and is not the real party in interest.
The trial court erred in not dismissing the action.
POINT 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTIXG T.A.GGART TO BE JOINED AS A
PARTY PL.A.INTIFF.
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There are two reasons why the lower court in the
pre-trial erred in permitting Plaintiff-Respondent Taggart to be joined as a party plaintiff.

A.
Where an action is brought by one not the real
party in interest, it is error to permit the joining of
the real party in interest. The situation in Skewes v.
Dunn, 3 U. 186, 2 P. 64, was somewhat similar to the
case at bar. William Skewes filed an action to collect
a note. It developed that his wife was the real party in
interest, and during the proceedings, Skewes filed an
affidavit to this effect and moved the court to substitute
her as the plaintiff. Our Supreme Court said: "The
court below erred in substituting her as plaintiff, because at time of the commencement of the case in the
justice's court, as it appears by the affidavit of William
Skewes on the motion to substitute, that William was
not the real party in interest in the action."

B.
Inasmuch as Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero had
been dissolved and lacked legal capacity therefore to
sue, there was nothing before the court to amend.
The effect of the dissolution of Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero in incapacitating it to sue is fully argued
in Point 1 above, and will not be restated here. There
are numerous cases, however, that hold that where such
lack of legal capacity exists in the plaintiff, a trial court
12
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permit the joining or substitution of another
party plaintiff during the course of the proceedings.

rat111ot

In St. :\lark's

~I.

E. Church v. Georgia Power Co.,

19 Ga. ;:\ pp. 633, 91 SE 1047, an action was originally

brought in the name of a church which was not a legal
person. The court held that the complaint could not
be axnended by substituting a plaintiff suing for the
use of the church, saying that the original action was
a nullity. There was nothing to amend.
Brooks v. Boston & N. Street R. Co., 211 Mass.
'277. 97 NE 760, is another case in point. The statute
involved provided that "the court may ... allow any
other amendment in matter of form or ~ubstance in
any process, pleading or proceeding which may enable
the plaintiff to sustain the action for the cause for which
it was intended to be brought." The court said: "This
language (of the statute) in plain words indicates the
existence of a real plaintiff as the original instigator
of the action. It gives no countenance to the idea that
something phantasmal and visionary may be given a
body and a substance by the aid of subsequent events.
It pre-supposes a plaintiff. Here there was no plaintiff.
. . . The present decision does not impair in any degree
that which has been said in these and many other cases
as to the liberality with which amendments are allowed
under our practice. It only holds that where, in the
nature of things, no person can be plaintiff and the
cause of action is in suspense, an action cannot be instituted. If no action can be instituted, there is nothing
to amend."
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Rule 15 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for amendments, stating that "A party may
amend his pleading ... "Applying the rule of the foregoing case to the within case, there is no "party" before
the court who "may amend his pleading."
The same rule was applied by the court in Mexican
Mill v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 4 Nev. 40, 97
Am. Dec. 510. The court said that the very first step
toward the commencement of a civil action is the filing
of a complaint in which it is indispensable that there
be shown a plaintiff and a defendant, without which
the action is an absolute nullity. All subsequent proceedings under it are void. The defect could not be cured
by supplying the names of the persons involved, since
there was no action to amend.
Thus, applying the foregoing cases, Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero, was non-existent at the commencement of the within action. There was nothing
before the court to amend, and the attempt to amend
by adding Mr. Taggart as a party plaintiff was futile.
The court erred in permitting such an amendment.

POINT 4.
THE COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A
CLAIM AS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
PREDICATED, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED.

14
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Det'endant-1\ppellant's First Defense reads as
follows: "The Complaint does not state a claim as
against this Defendant upon which relief can be predil'ntcd or granted." (Tr. p. 5).
In paragraph 3 of the complaint there appears the
following allegation: " ... ,but that said claimed interest of said defendants is invalid and inferior to the
right, title and interest of the plaintiff in and to said
property; ... " ( Tr. pages 2 & 3) . (Italics ours) . The
prayer of said complaint contains the following: " ... ;
that any interest claimed by any defendant, either
known or unknown, is invalid and is inferior to the right,
title and interest of the plaintiff; ... " (Tr. p. 4). (Italics
ours.)
In 'Vorley v. Peterson, 80 U. 27, 41, 12 P 2d 579,
at page 584, our Supreme Court said: "To allege, as it
is, that the asserted claims of the defendants were merely
'junior and inferior' to the title and interest, etc., of
the plaintiffs, does not show that such asserted claims
were adverse or hostile to or in conflict with the plaintiffs' alleged title or interest."
Thus, in the case at bar, Plaintiffs-Respondents,
in using the term "inferior" in the body and prayer of
the complaint, admitted the defendants had a claim,
e\·en though inferior to that of the plaintiffs. For this
reason, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The trial court should have dismissed it.

15
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POINT 5.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE
IS NOT DEFEATED BY THE FOUR-YEAR
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATION
STATUTES RELATING TO TAX TITLES.
Under this Point, the first question arising is
whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents are relying upon
the four-year adverse possession and limitation statutes.
While there is no allegation in the Complaint (Tr.
pages 1 to 4) that Plaintiffs-Respondents claim under
a tax title, there was discussion during the course of
the trial and in the arguments to the lower court concerning the application of the four-year statutes relating
to tax titles. The pre-trial order refers to these statutes
( Tr. p. 10), and the Memorandum Decision of the trial
court (Tr. p. 12) states that Plaintiffs are entitled to
a judgment by virtue of one of said statutes.
Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact (Tr. p. 14)
states, "That the Plaintiff, Falconaero Enterprise, Inc.,
by and through its predecessors in title, purchased the
land subject of this action from Salt Lake County,
obtaining a County Tax Deed thereto by reason of a
prior tax sale; ... " But there is no reference in the
Conclusions of Law that Plaintiffs are entitled to a
decree by virtue of the said four-year statutes. In fact,
nowhere in the Findings, Conclusions or Decree does
any reference appear regarding these statutes. Consequently, Defendant-Appellant urges this Court to
16
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hold that, if the Plaintiffs-Respondents had such a
theory of' the case, they have abandoned the same. At
least the Decree is unsubstantiated without a Conclusion
applying these statutes.
Should this Court hold, however, that the Plaintiffs-Respondents have not abandoned this theory of
their ease, and that the Decree is supported by the Findings and Conclusions, then we present the following
nrguments and citations which conclusively show that
they failed in their proof, and that the evidence does not
support the Findings, Conclusions and Decree.
Section 104-2-5.11, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951,
defines a "tax title" as follows:
"The term tax title as used in Section 104-2-5.10
and Section 80-10-68.10, and the related amended Sections 104-2-5, 104-2-7, and 104-2-12, means any title
to real property, whether valid or not~ which has been
derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer of such property in the course of a
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax
ln·icd against such property whereby the property is
rclic·ced from a tax lien.n (Italics ours) .
Thus, it is necessary that Plaintiffs-Respondents,
as the tax title claimants, produce evidence that· a tax
was levied against the property, there was a tax sale for
the non-payment of taxes, and, the redemption period
haYing expired, that a final sale was made to the county.
Then they must prove that the property was relieved
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of the tax lien. This is the law whether one claims under
a valid tax title~ or one that is invalid.
The only evidence submitted by Plaintiffs-Respondents were the Auditor's Deed dated February
28th, 1939, to the County, executed pursuant to the
provisions of Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 66, Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933 (Pre-trial Exhibit 4), and the
deed from Salt Lake County to Mr. Hancock dated
December 31st, 1943, executed by virtue of Title 80,
Chapter 10, Section 68, Utah Code Annotated 1943
(P. Exhibit 3). Defendant-Appellant contends that
neither of these two deeds proves any one of the foregoing requirements set forth above in the definition of
tax title.
Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933,
provided that the deed issued by the county auditor,
when duly executed and delivered, would be prima facie
evidence of the facts recited therein. But this is no longer
the law. The 1939 session of our legislature amended
the taxing procedures, including this section, by enacting Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1939, which amendment
became effective in September, 1939. The amendment,
which became known as Section 80-10-68, provides a
new form of tax deed, and subparagraph ( 5) therein
states that this new tax deed should be prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent
to the premliminary sale.
The Auditor's Deed in this case was issued February 28th, 1939, under the old law, and several months
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before the new act became effective. Thus, it is no longer
prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein~ the old
statute having been amended. Nor is it, under the new
law, prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent to the preliminary sale~ for it does
not conform thereto. In fact, this deed is not prima
facie evidence of anything at the present time. The case
of .Anson v. Ellison, 104 U. 576, 140 P. 2d 653, explains
this very clearly.
Neither is the deed from the County to Mr. Hancock ( P. Exhibit 3) , executed by virtue of Section
80-10-68, subparagraph ( 8), Utah Code Annotated
1943, prima facie evidence of anything, for the statute
does not so provide. This also is explained in the Anson
v. Ellison case. In fact, this case goes so far as to hold
that although the parties enter into a stipulation that
a certificate of sale had been issued (under the law such
certificate being prima facie evidence of all proceedings
to and including the preliminary treasurer's tax sale) ,
such stipulation will not show a valid levy and assessment of taxes.
Thus, Plaintiffs-Respondents have not proved
there was a tax levied upon the property, that the property was sold for the non-payment of taxes, nor that
the property was relieved from a tax lien, as required
by the definition of tax title in the statute. Consequently,
there is a total failure of proof. They have not proved
a tax title, either valid or invalid. Having thusly failed,
there is absolutely no basis upon which to apply the
four-year adverse possession and limitation statutes in
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behalf of the claimant of a tax title. The trial court
should have upheld Defendant-Appellant's fee title,
and was in error in refusing to do so.
In view of the law as set forth in Kurz v. Blume,
407 Ill. 383, 95 NE 2d 338, 25 ALR 2d 1258, at pages
1263-64, regarding presumptions in quiet title cases,
and which will be discussed fully in Point 6, which
follows, the court is not justified in raising a presumption, or assuming that Plaintiffs-Respondents had a
tax title in order to satisfy the statute defining the same.

POINT 6.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE
IS NOT DEFEATED BY THE SEVEN-YEAR
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATION
STATUTES.
The Seven-year adverse possession statutes applicable to the case before the Court are Sections 78-12-5,
6, 7, 8, 9 and 12, UCA 1953. Under them, an adverse
claimant is required to pay the taxes over a seven-year
period. Here, the only evidence of the payment of taxes
prior to delinquency covers the years 1955 to 1961,
inclusive ( P. Exhibit 30) . Thus, the evidence of physical
occupancy by Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero must
be limited to these years. It should be pointed out that
much of the testimony is indefinite as to time, and fails
to meet the test of the citation in the following paragraph.
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To establish adverse possession, the type of evidt'HCe required is clearly stated in Kurz v. Blume, 407
I II. aHa, 95 NE 338, 25 ALR 2d 1258, at pages 1263ti ~. as follows: " ' ... It must be ( 1) hostile or adverse;
(~) actual; ( 3) visible, notorious and exclusive; ( 4)
eontinuous; and ( 5) under a claim of title inconsistent
with that of the possessor of the record title.' In applying this formula for proof of adverse possession, we
have held that it cannot be made out by inference or
implicationJ but must be established by evidence that is
dear, positive and unequivocat all presumptions being
in favor of the true owner. Loverkamp v. Loverkamp,
381 Ill. 467, 45 NE 2d 871; Yunkes v. Webb, 399
Ill. ~2, 170 NE 709; Wilkinson v. Watt, 309 Ill. 607,
141 NE 383." (Italics ours).
Our statutes recognize these presumptions in favor
of the holder of the fee title. By virtue of Section 7812-7, UC A 1953, Defendant-Appellant, in this case,
having established the legal title to the property, is
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the
time required by law, and the occupation of it by any
other person is deemed to have been under and in subordination of J)efendant-Appellant's title, unless ad\·erse possession be established here by Plaintiffs-Respondents under the four-year or the seven.:.year statutes.
Section 78-12-9, UCA 1953, sets out the requirements for adverse possession under a written instrument,
substantially as follows:
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( 1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
( 2) Where it has been protected by a substantial
inclosure.
( 3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used
for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary
use of the occupant.

( 4) Where a known farm or single lot has been
partly improved, the use or inclosure of part is deemed
to extend to the whole.
In applying the above requirements to the within
case, it is readily seen that Plaintiffs-Respondents have
not established adverse possession, and that any possession they had is deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the fee title of Defendant-Appellant.
Under paragraph ( 1) there was no evidence of
cultivation. Mr. Firmage stated the property was used
only for grazing ( Tr. p. 59) . Also, the lack of cultivation is evidenced by the wild grass shown in the photos
(P. Exhibits 7 to 21, inclusive). As to improvements,
the photos do not show any. In the testimony, there was
some reference to ditches, but their location and the time
of the supposed construction of them is neither positive
nor clear. (Tr. p. 40). The claimed improvements to
the lake were indefinite as to the nature and extent
thereof ( Tr. pages 40 & 41 ) , and do not establish adverse possession of the 20-acre tract with which we are
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here concerned, and which lies some distance away.
Thus, there is a total failure to support adverse possession under said paragraph (I) of Section 78-12-9,
UC1\ 1953.
In attempting to comply with the requirements
of a substantial inclosure as provided in paragraph ( 2)
of said Section, Plaintiffs-Respondents presented voluminous testimony of barb wire electric fencing around
the peri1neter of the 1000-acre tract, which fencing Mr.
F'irmage said they used because it was economical (Tr.
p. 43). However, the photos (P. Exhibits 7 to 21, inelusive) showed clearly, positively and unequivocally
that it did not constitute a "substantial inclosure." Most
of the intermittent and irregularly spaced posts shown
in the photos had no wire attached, and the few that
did have, showed the wire running into the ground. If
anything, the photos constitute conclusive proof that
there never had been a "substantial inclosure" around
the property.
In construing paragraph (3) of Section 78-12-9,
UCA 1953, relating to the use of property "for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant," the law
is set out in 3 Am. J ur. 2d, pages 93 and 94, under the
heading of "Adverse Possession," in the following
terms:
"The determination of what constitutes possession
of property for purposes of adverse possession depends
to a large extent upon the character of the premises.
Thus, in determining what will amount to an actual
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possession of land, considerable importance must be
attached to its nature, character, and locality, and to
the uses to which it can be applied, or to which the
claimant may choose to apply it. Indeed, to constitute
adverse possession the claimant must appropriate the
land to some purpose to which it is adapted."
Our own Court applied this same rule in the case
of Day v. Steele, I l l U. 481, 184 P2d 216.
Defendant-Appellant submits that the operation
of a chuck wagon restaurant and stables over threequarters of a mile away from the property in this suit,
fails to establish clearly~ positively or uneqivocally~ or
otherwise, any use of the 20-acre tract with which we
are here concerned.
According to Mr. Firmage (Tr. p. 59), the only
use made of the 20-acre tract was for pasturage, and
its use was in connection with the remainder of the 1000
acres. Mr. Firmage testified that the revenues for this
use during the years 1957 to 1961 ranged from $150.00
per year to approximately $400.00 per year (Tr. pages
54, 55, P. Exhibits 22 to 28) -a tidy return on property
worth about two million dollars!
The officers of Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero
thought the property was suited for business and industrial purposes, which uses were described in the articles
of incorporation. The property lies just south of 21st
South Street, a state highway, which is lined on both
sides with industrial and business enterprises. In all
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the years Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero claimed it,
not once did they use it for the business and industrial
purposes planned and for which it is suitable. It finally
sold for approximately two million dollars, and they
used it only to pasture horses for a pittance!
Thus, Plaintiffs-Respondents have failed miserably
to establish by "clear, positive and unequivocal" evidence
that the 20-acre tract has been used by them "to some
purpose to which it is adapted," considering "its nature,
elmracter, and locality."
There was no evidence, nor did the court find,
that the 20-acre tract was part of a "known farm," as
specified in paragraph (4) of Section 78-12-9, UCA
HL>3. Consequently, this paragraph gives no aid or
comfort to Plaintiffs-Respondents.
By way of summary of the foregoing, the law is
clear that all presumptions are in favor of the record
owner-here, Defendant-Appellant; that adverse possession must be established by clear, positive and unequivocal evidence; if there is an inclosure, it must be
substantial; and the land must be appropriated to some
purpose to which it is adapted, considering its nature,
character and locality.

Plaintiffs-Respondents' evidence showed an inexpensive and flimsy inclosure, temporary ·in nature; the
improvements were nil; and the use of the 1000-acre
tract of which this is a small part, consisted of grazing
horses for insignificant sums, on land which sold for
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about two million dollars, and which the owners thought
to be suitable for business and industrial purposes, and
which is surrounded by business and industrial properties.
There is but one conclusion: Defendant-Appellant
has the fee title, and is presumed to be in the possession
of the said property. Plaintiffs-Respondents absolutely
failed to establish adverse possession under the statutes
and citations set forth above. The trial court was in
error in finding that it was established and in rendering
a decree predicated thereon.

CONCLUSION
It is clear from the record that Plaintiff-Respondent Falconaero lacked capacity to sue, and, in addition,
was not the real party in interest. Therefore, for either
one or both of these reasons, it had no standing in court.
For either one or both of these same reasons, there was
nothing before the court when Falconaero attempted
to amend the Complaint by adding Mr. Taggart as a
party Plaintiff. The trial court should have ended the
matter forthwith by dismissing the Complaint.
Further, when Falconaero stated in its Complaint
that Defendant had an interest which was "inferior"
to that of the Plaintiff, it admitted Defendant's interest.
In so doing, it failed to state a cause of action for adverse possession, and the trial court should have dismissed the Complaint.
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From the record, it also is clear that PlaintiffsHes pondents either abandoned any theory they might
have had of adverse possession under the four-year
statutes relating to tax titles, or that they failed in their
attempt to prove one.
Under the seven-year adverse possession and limitation statutes, there also was a failure by PlaintiffsHespondents to prove the statutory requirements. Consequently, all presumptions being favorable to Defendant-Appellant, the holder of the fee title, the trial court
should have granted decree favorable to DefendantAppellant.
Consequently, the findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and decree are totally unsupported by the evidence
and the Ia w, and the trial court should be reversed as
a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
William D. Callister
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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